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Abstract 
We examine the impacts of the indicators contributing to the effectiveness of tax regulation 
performances described by the topic of Paying Taxes in Doing Business report on the foreign 
direct investment inflows. We further focus on the effects the same determinants have on two 
different modes of FDI: greenfield FDI and cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). This 
study uses panel data of one hundred fifty-six countries across all regions. The methodology 
applies random effects econometric tool to conduct a global investigation on the relation between 
the level of tax regulation and administration performances and the types of FDI, with further 
more focalized extraction of information applied to seventeen geographic regions. The main 
findings suggest that while the high degree model does not detect strong significant relations 
between factors of tax administration and types of FDI; however, a more scrupulous analysis by 
regions reveals strong correlations between effective tax regulations and levels of foreign direct 
investment flows to host economies. Additionally, the study suggests that differentiated factors 
of tax administration and regulation tools should be considered due to the regional affiliation of a 
potential host economy to drive foreign investments. The results of the study can be used as a 
guidance for country administrators in assessment of those specific determinants that could lead 
to improvement of targeted types of FDI in their specific country as part of a given region. Also, 
the investors may find the results useful for the evaluation of tax regulations and administration 
performances in potential host countries in terms of targeted investments.         
 
Keywords: foreign direct investments (FDI), greenfield FDI, mergers and acquisitions (M&As), 
tax administration, tax regulations  
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1. Introduction 
The public sector literature contains comparatively more limited volume of papers addressing 
particularly the topics of tax administration performance in relation with the inflow of foreign 
direct investments (FDI) to destination (host) economies and specifically when addressing two 
different modes of investments: cross-border mergers and acquisitions and greenfield FDI. The 
clarity of this issue is particularly important as many low income countries and transition 
economies view the foreign direct investments as a positive factor in enhancement of economic 
development and, to some extent, a solution for their economic problems (Mencinger, 2003; 
Wang, 2009).  To answer this question we analyze the attractiveness of various economies for 
FDI through the analysis of the Paying Taxes topic of Doing Business report. The Doing 
Business report created as a collaboration of the World Bank and PwC is an unprecedented 
statistical tool that groups public sector performance indicators into ten main topics, comprised 
of forty-one subtopics, describing performance of 190 economies (World Bank, 2018). The dual 
approach to assignment of rankings for each economy includes the scores for an ease of doing 
business and a distance to frontier (DTF), the latter describing the proximity to the most 
successful performance practices in a given subgroup.  
This study investigates whether there is an effect and at what extent host economy’s more 
effective tax regulation practices may impact the FDI inflow. The Paying Taxes topic of Doing 
Business supplies a useful quantified assessment of a range of tax administration performance 
measurements. While the DB reports are available throughout 2018, we choose the reports for 
the years 2009 to 2016, which correspond with the period of economic recovery and the latest 
available data on FDI. This study focuses on one hundred fifty-six economies further combining 





First, we investigate the effects of tax regulation and management practices on FDI 
inflow. Second, we separately study the same effects on two different modes of FDI: cross-
border mergers and acquisitions, followed by greenfield FDI. Usually, the greenfield investments 
are considered as being more productive for destination countries, as the investing company 
builds its operations from ground up as a new business. In case of cross border mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) the transaction implies that parent company invests in some form of 
purchase of domestic entity, usually accompanied by the change of management and/or 
operations of acquired firm (Blonigen and Slaughter, 2001;  Wang and Wong, 2009).  
The methodology uses Random Effects model (RE). This strategy allows utilization of 
time-invariant performance characteristics as control variables and helps to define the qualitative 
impact of tax administration practices across different levels of FDI inflow distribution. This 
empirical approach is similarly applied to the investigations of M&A, and greenfield FDIs.  
The contribution of this study is twofold. A comparative study of M&A and greenfield 
FDI is a fresh angle for a sought after topic of FDI, specifically, due to the data limitations on 
greenfield FDI, which have only been published since 2003. Additionally, the study contributes 
to the literature on the effects of public policies of tax regulations and administration on different 
types of FDI and adds in depth analysis of those determinants applied to seventeen world 
regions.           
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers a brief review of the literature. 
Section 3 discusses the variables used in the study. In section 4 an empirical model with the 
econometric strategy is presented. Section 5 offers discussion of the main results. Section 6 
concludes and offers policy implications. 
2. Literature Review 
The vast economic literature on the effects of FDI on the economies of host countries, 
particularly developing or transition economies, mostly views it as a positive factor in 
enhancement of economic development and to some extent as a solution for their economic 
problems (Mencinger, 2003; Wang, 2009).  From the public policy perspectives, the reports from 
international organizations, OECD, World Bank, highlight the notion of developing countries to 
consider FDI as the primary source of economic growth and modernization (OECD, 2002; Klein 
et al., 2001). Therefore, the governments of these countries, being ready for negotiations, 
encumber significant costs associated with the attraction of new investments (Carkovic and 
Levine, 2002; Ford et al., 2008). Some of the tools considered to incentivize foreign direct 
investors include tax holidays, exemptions from import duties, the provision of land for facilities, 
and direct subsidies (Hanson, 2001). 
 The international public economics literature on FDI studies mainly has consensus on 
demanding assessment of multifaceted factors of public administration as essential in deriving 
the true role of FDI in host countries. In this regard, in the literature some of the most common 
factors linked with the studies of FDI are: economic growth, GDP and/or GDP per capita, stock 
of domestic capital; human capital, level of economically active population or unemployed, cost 
of labor; government spending, real government consumption; international activities, export and 
import (Zhang, 2001; Mencinger, 2003; Omran and Bolbol, 2003; Akinlo, 2004; Asheghian, 
2004; Chang, 2006; Hansen and Rand, 2006; Xu and Wang, 2007; Vu, 2008; Baharumshah and 
Almasaied, 2009; Moura and Forte, 2010).  
 Two main groups of thought can be defined when summarizing the literature on the 





different aspects that impact changes in tax ratios, particularly corporate income tax and tax on 
capital, and how it may impact FDI. This is a comparatively closer analyzed topic which 
concludes an inverse nature of this relation (Chakraborty and Basu, 2002; Mooij and Ederveen, 
2003; Becker et al., 2012)  Of that, Chakraborty and Basu (2002) used the quotient of import 
taxes in GDP supplemented with factors of unit labor cost and FDI to derive empirical results for 
economic growth in India. Becker et al. (2012) measure the effects of changes in corporate tax 
on quality and quantity of foreign direct investments. Their study of twenty-two European 
countries concludes that the governments should vigilantly consider not only the level of FDI 
inflows, but also the qualitative implications that an each inbound unit of capital may have on 
both income tax base and labor income.     
 While second, and smaller, group studies the topics closely associated with the specifics 
of tax administration (Dharmapala and Hines, 2009; Lawless, 2011; Martinez-Vazquez and 
Vulovic, 2011; Goodspeed et al., 2011). Thus, Lawless in 2011 analyses the relation of the FDI 
and tax system through the perspective of latter’s complexity through studies of bilateral FDI 
relations between sixteen OECD FDI source countries and fifty-seven host countries. She 
estimates that a 10 percent reduction in tax complexity corresponds with a tax reduction by 1 
percent. Dharmapala and Hines go one step further and look at tax heavens. Regardless of low 
tax rates, the primary concern of investors is a better quality of governance. The conclusion of 
their investigation draws a picture of a typical tax heaven where apart from low statutory tax rate 
it is also affluent with population below 1 million and high quality governance (Dharmapala and 
Hines, 2009).   
 
3. Materials and Methods 
 Data.  
 Control variables 
 The economic development literature finds the level of development of legal institutions 
and specifically the security for property rights and intellectual property as being indirect 
determinants for countries’ economic growth (Miletkov and Wintoki, 2012).  We extend this 
notion to the studies of FDI and determine whether the existence of more effective tax regulation 
and administration practices in host countries may attract additional investments. Therefore, 
following the focus of the study we include ten variables describing performance of tax 
regulations for the period from 2009 to 2016 (Table2). The control variables are derived from the 
Paying Taxes topic of Doing Business ranking, a flagship report created as a collaborative effort 
of the World Bank and PwC teams, which assigns quantitative scores to the performance of tax 
regulations in 190 economies applied to a typical medium-size company1. From here, we create a 
selective dataset based on the full-set of data availability covering 156 economies. These 
economies are further grouped into seventeen regions (Table 1).  
 The first and most exhaustive control variable that describes the effectiveness of tax 
regulations and administration from a typical medium-size company standpoint the ease of 
paying taxes in a given economy (DTF paying taxes) is measured as a distance to frontier or to 
the best practice in this category. It is a comprehensive score reflecting a number of activities by 
a standardized company during the second year of operations such as number of taxes paid, the 






method and the frequency of payment, the frequency of tax filing and the number of agencies 
involved, the taxes withheld, etc.  
 The variables representing the quotients of tax rates to the profit (Table 2): The total tax 
and contribution rate (% of profit) is a measurement, different from a statutory tax rate, that 
estimates the cost of all the taxes for a standardized medium-size business during second year of 
its operations. In general terms, it is sum of all payable taxes and contributions (sum of profit tax, 
labor tax and contributions, and other taxes) divided by commercial profit of the business for a 
given period. Since the total tax ratio as an aggregate variable does not clearly represent how the 
changes per each tax may impact the FDIs studied in the analysis, therefore while the variable is 
included in the model, however the effect of each tax ratio as percent of profit is considered 
when discussing the results. In regards to the some of outliers in the data set (Table 2). The min 
[−0.4] in profit tax rate (% of profit) for France in 2016 is due to the method of estimation in the 
data source.  The other taxes (% of profit) exceeding 100% is due to the following countries: 
Argentina for the period of 2015-2016, Burundi 2009-2011, Central African Republic 2009-
2011, Comoros 2009-2016, Congo, Dem. Republic 2009-2013, The Gambia 2009-2014, and 
Sierra Leone 2009-2011. Further, this high ratio of other taxes exceeding 100 percent has a 
similar impact on the total tax and contribution rate (% of profit). Belarus in 2009, Sri Lanka 
2012, and Argentina for 2009-2016 also exceed the threshold of 100% of total tax and 
contribution rate as percent of profit.   
      In order to get more balanced dataset, the score for the explanatory variable time (in 
weeks) to obtain VAT refund is merged with two other measures provided in the Paying Taxes 
report- the indicator estimating whether VAT exists in a given economy and another one 
measuring VAT refund process per each case. Basically, these three variables are logically 
combined, assigning to the cases with VAT and no refund practices the highest value of 100 
assuming the most unfavorable terms for FDI. Meantime, the cases with no VAT and therefore 
no refund practices receive a 0 score, therefore assuming the most favorable conditions for FDI. 
Before all these modifications, the score for this variable was in the range [1; 90] weeks, with 
lower scores describing better regulations practices for VAT refunds with the lowest in Sri 
Lanka. The countries included in the analysis with no VAT practices, and therefore assigned 0 
score are Angola, Bahrain, Bhutan, Eritrea, Iraq, Kuwait, Liberia, Oman, Qatar, São Tomé and 
Príncipe, Saudi Arabia, South Sudan and the United States.  
      The variable defining CIT regulations practices, the percentage of cases exposed to a 
corporate income tax audit (%), has also been modified to a more useful format for current 
model. Thus, the indicator is reported as a quartile with the efficient performances being in the 
lowest [0%; 24%] quartile and the least efficient performances in the highest [75%; 100%] 
quartile, therefore naturally creating four indices. Since, there are also countries that do not levy 
CIT, such as The Bahamas, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, The United Arab Emirates, a score 0 is 
assigned to this countries summarizing the best CIT practices (no tax) for FDI. Overall this 
variable takes numbers in the range [0; 4].   
  The factor of the time to comply with a corporate income tax audit is slightly modified by 
adding a score 0 describing practices of aforementioned countries which do not levy CIT.  
 The only non-tax related indicator adapted from the  Doing Business report is the DTF 
global, the most comprehensive score for the overall doing business measure assessed through 
the closeness to the frontier and the best practices. The higher scores assume more business 
friendly environment in terms of overall regulations. A small modification here is related to a 





modified, however, for missing data we use the last available data for a case and extend it to the 
earlier periods.     
 The overview of more recent literature suggests the size of host country markets being 
one of the most popular explanatory variables of a country’s propensity to attract FDI, 
specifically for studies of developing countries. In this regard researchers use some of the 
market related variables, such as GDP, population, GDP per capita, GDP growth and population 
(Agrawal, 1980; Schneider and Frey, 1985; Wheeler and Moody, 1992; Taylor, 2000; 
Nunnenkamp, 2002).  Following this notion, in this analysis we use the annual GDP per capita 
in the US dollars and constant prices of 2010 retrieved from the World Indicators database 
published by the World Bank. To assess the real GDP for 2016, and due to the fact that only the 
global nominal GDP for 2016 is available at this time, the estimated quotient of its annual 
change in 2016 is further applied to the estimates of real GDP in 2010 prices for 20152. 
 The control variable regions is defined through the classification of economies used by 
the United Nations conference on trade and development report (Table 1). This variable is used 
for two purposes. First, we control for this explanatory variable, when introducing the general 
equation with the unobserved error term. Second, the sorting of the global panel dataset into 
regions allows further advancement in the regionally driven assessments for our investigation.     
 
 
                                                           
2 https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/country/by-country/startyear/LTST/endyear/LTST/indicator/NY-
GDP-PCAP-CD# 
 Dependent variables 
 This study focuses on three dependent variables which determine the levels of annual 
FDI in a host economy. We start with the FDI inflow, followed by two different modes of FDI: 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions and greenfield FDI. The updated data for all three 
variables is derived from the United Nations conference on trade and development online 
database. Here we specifically focus on the FDI performance from the start of this current 
economic cycle in 2009 till 2016, the latest available data on FDI flow. Due to the nature of this 
study we treat all FDI related variables that are equal to zero as valid cases, as we assume and 
further test the concept that poorly performed tax administration practices may negatively impact 
the decisions of investors, therefore not generating FDIs. The available literature studying the 
relation of FDI and GDP, with the latter being an independent variable, suggests a wide use of 
both variables as logarithms (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002; Gao, 2005).  Following this notion, 
in this analysis all three dependent variables, FDI inflow, M&A, and greenfield FDI, as well as 
GDP per capita are measured in logarithms.  
   
4. Methodology 
This section describes the empirical strategy used to assess the impact of tax regulations 
related practices on the flow of foreign direct investments to host economies. The discussion of 
the control variables in the previous section suggests that some of the factors are time-invariant, 
due to their nature and statistical reporting style. The assessment through Hausman specification 
test confirms that random effects (RE) in comparison with fixed effects model would be the best 
fit to model this data, as it allows utilization of time-invariant panel data. In addition the Breusch 





model over Pooled OLS regression (Table 3). Another advantage of RE for this analysis is the 
possibility to control for unreported error or variance at country levels that is uncorrelated with 
other independent variables for the global model. Therefore, the model includes residuals at both 
levels. The high level residual is random effects.  
We start the model with the following equations below. The equation below describes the 
model for assessment of FDI inflow relation with the Doing Business statistics on tax 
regulations. A similar approach and discussion is relevant to the models of greenfield FDI and 
mergers and acquisitions.  
𝐿𝑛 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑡 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑛 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + [𝛼5𝐷𝐵1 + ⋯ + 𝛼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑁] + 𝜀𝑖𝑡3 [1] 
As a note,  
where, 
𝛽0𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛼𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗    [2] 
𝑖 = 1,2, … , 156, 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 8, 𝑗 = 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑎 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 − 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 is a general term that represents time-invariant explanatory variables used in this model. 
Thus, the following control variables are time-invariant: Regions, % of cases for CIT audit, time 
to comply with CIT audit, and time to obtain VAT refund.  
From here, in order to assess the global equation, we combine equations [1] and [2], by 
replacing  𝛽0𝑡 with the right part of equation [2]. 
Thus, the final equation used for the global analysis can be presented as the follows: 
                                                           
3 The term [𝛼5𝐷𝐵1 + ⋯ + 𝛼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑁]  contains only time variant control variables   
𝐿𝑛 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑛 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + [𝛼3𝐷𝐵1𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝛼𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑁𝑡] + (𝑢𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡) [3] 
Where,  
𝐿𝑛 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡   -type of a studied FDI flow (FDI inflow, Greenfield FDI, and Mergers and 
Acquisitions) to a host  
𝐿𝑛 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡    - GDP per capita  
𝐷𝐵1𝑡 … 𝐷𝐵𝑁𝑡 - set of vectors derived from Doing Business ranking, also includes the time-
invariant variables mentioned in equation [2] 
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠   - includes 17 regions comprised of total 156 countries (Table 1) 
𝑢𝑖  -uncorrelated with other independent variables error term  
𝜀𝑖𝑡   -error term of the estimation  
𝑖-                      -id of a country, i = 1, …, 156  
𝑡  -time period, t=1, 2, …, 8. 
 It should be noted that the composite error term (𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡) allows assessment of variation 
at both levels “micro” and “macro” and is reported as between and within errors, respectively. 
Additionally, if we use a term 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑗 as a general interpretation for all independent variables in 
equations [1],  then 
𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑗 , 𝑢𝑗)= 0 , where 𝑡 = 1,2 … , 8 and 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 156. 
 In other words, the unobserved effect 𝑢𝑡 is uncorrelated with all other independent 





aspects of tax regulations, the GLS transformation of the RE model, while eliminating the serial 
correlation in the errors, allows observation of explanatory variables that are constant over time.   
 The same RE model is further adjusted for investigation of the effects through their 
distribution by regions. Therefore, equation [3] is further adapted to the model that is partitioned 
into seventeen regions (Table 1). 
𝐿𝑛 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡𝑖
𝜌










)      [4] 
Where, 
𝜌  -stands for a region, 𝜌 = 1,2. . ,17. 
Here, again, the analysis is conducted with the attention to the so-called “between” or 
macro level, where countries of the same region are compared, and “within” or micro level, where 
a particular country information is compared for 8 periods. The results are reported for 5 percent, 
also for 1 percent and 10 percent significance.  
 
5. Results 
Overall, the global scale analysis of the relation between the indicators of the level of 
effectiveness in tax regulation and different types of FDI did not reveal very strong correlations 
(Table 3). Thus, when focusing on the first column of Table 4 which describes a general relation 
of FDI inflow and control variables characterizing effectiveness of tax regulations, the analysis 
defines only a significant relation with ln GDP per capita, which is a widely accepted 
determinant for FDI found in the literature. Similarly, the analysis by modes of FDI, greenfield 
FDI and cross-border M&A, are also sensitive to the level of national income for choosing a host 
country for investments. The only tax related control variable that has significant impact on two 
modes of FDI is the time to deal with taxes in hours per year, with a highest significance degree 
of 1 percent associated with greenfield FDI. M&A performs the most responsiveness to this 
global mode responding to two other tax related variables, such as DTF paying taxes and number 
of payments per year suggesting that, in general, the countries with more effective systems of tax 
regulations have better chances to attract these types of investments.   
In general, when the sensitivity of types of investments to the determinants of tax 
regulations are compared by regions, the greenfield FDI noticebly is the most susceptable across 
all explanatory variables, included in the model  [4] (comparison of Tables 5, 6 and 7).  Thus, 
the greenfield investors in eleven regions are sensitive to DTF global (versus only 8 for FDI 
inflow and 2 for M&A), in nine regions are sensitive to time per hours (versus only 6 for FDI 
inflow and 3 for M&A) and in eight regions are sensitive to number of payments (versus only 4 
for FDI inflow and 7 for M&A). The FDI inflow is the most sensitive to GDP per capita (10 
regions, versus 8 for both M&A and greenfield FDI) and the time to comply with CIT audit (9 
regions, versus 8 for both M&A and greenfield FDI). If summarized, the FDI inflow is the most 
sensitive to GDP per capita (10 regions), time to comply with CIT audit (9 regions), and DTF 
global (8 regions). Those investors who pursue greenfield FDI deals are the most sensitive to 
DTF global (11 regions), time (9 regions), and number of payments, time to comply with CIT 
audit and GDP per capita (8 regions each). The investors who are interested to conduct cross-
border mergers and acquistions first pay attention to the GDP per capita and time to copmly with 
CIT audit (8 regions each), number of payments per year (7 regions), and the other taxes to profit 





The analysis by regions reveals very valuable and important specifics on the aspects that 
are more typical for investors in those regions and also by types of investments. Starting with the 
preliminary data for the analysis and onward, there are large discrepancies by regions, therefore a 
supplied supplemental descriptive statistics (only means of variables) table divided by regions 
provides additional insights to better communicate the study results (Table 8).    
Across the seventeen regions studied in the paper the highest volume of all three types of 
FDI analyzed in the paper are directed to the North America region followed by East Asia. 
Caribbean region gets the lowest FDI inflow and greenfield FDI, while the lowest mergers and 
acquisitions are reported in Central Africa. Another region with the lowest FDI is East Africa. 
The overall best tax and business practices are assumed in the Other Developed Europe and 
North America regions, respectively. At the time of study the regions that needed the most 
improvements in terms of tax administration and business regulations are Central Africa and 
West Africa regions, respectively. The highest level of national income is reported in Other 
Developed Europe followed by North America region. The countries with the lowest GDP per 
capita are located in West Africa and a little higher income in East Africa. The regions with the 
highest total tax rates are Central Africa, West Africa, East Africa and South America, 
respectively. In all four cases other taxes contribute the highest share of the levied tax burden 
(Table 8). 
As a general trend the countries across all regions have higher degree of investments in 
mergers and acquisitions, except for Central Africa region, where greenfield FDI exceeds 
transactions in mergers and acquisitions. This notion of higher level of greenfield investments is 
observed for all ten countries across this region (Tables 5, 6, and 7).  
In the European Union the investors pay very close attention to the level of GDP. Thus, 
the level of economic development is the most important determinant for FDI inflow and 
mergers and acquisitions (the latter with the highest 1 percent significance). Additionally, the 
CIT audit related administrative measures, such the cases of CIT audit and time to comply with 
CIT audit, play significant role for mergers and acquisitions and greenfield investments. The 
greenfield investors also pay closer look at the tax rates. Interestingly, adding additional cases for 
CIT audit, therefore moving up in the quartile, leads to higher investments across all types 
analyzed in this paper, while an additional hour spent on complying with CIT audit leads to 
significant reductions in both M&A and greenfield investments. The comparatively more 
convenient environment for doing business also plays a significant role in attracting greenfield 
investments in the EU.               
In Other Developed Europe in addition to the high level of national income, the investors 
look for the overall effectiveness of tax regulations and administration described by the DTF 
paying taxes indicator. An additional percentile increase in this score leads to a larger increase in 
both FDI inflow and mergers in acquisitions. Greenfield investments are not sensitive to 
aforementioned characteristics, but rather to the overall easiness of doing business, described by 
DTF global, where a small improvement in this indicator translates into a significant increase in 
greenfield investments. Additionally, the change in the number of payments and quartile of cases 
considered for CIT audit, both have a reverse impact on greenfield investments.    
Similar to two previous regions, investors in North America look for a strong economy 
especially if the FDI inflow and mergers and acquisitions are addressed. Interestingly, North 
America region is one of those regions where investments in mergers and acquisitions are more 





only Canada levies value added tax in this region, this indicator describing efficiency of tax 
administration for VAT refunds is a significant characteristic of an economy in securing FDI 
inflows, and mergers and acquisitions. Additionally, mergers and acquisitions are sensitive to the 
change in number of payments, time to comply with CIT audit and all the tax rates, while being 
more susceptible to ratios of profit tax, and labor tax and contributions to total profit. Greenfield 
FDI is more driven by annual number of payments, time spent on preparation, filing and 
payment of major taxes and overall ease of doing business in this economies, described by a high 
score of DTF global.        
   Other Developed Economies region studied in the paper is less prone to the tax 
administrative variables described in the model. The FDI inflow is secured by a high degree 
of DTF global or the overall favorable conditions to conduct business; however, this relation 
is quite weak as it is described only by 10 percent significance level.  The efficiency of 
bureaucratic system leading to a reduction in numbers of payments is the most significant 
tool for stimulating mergers and acquisitions, and greenfield investment flows to this region.  
Greenfield FDI is also sensitive to the level of economic developement in this region.    
FDI inflows in North Africa region are mainly driven by the level of national income per 
capita, comparatively lower other taxes in Morocco and Egypt and profit tax in Algeria. This 
region has not been attracting large volume of transaction in mergers and acquisitions, except for 
modest investments in Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. Therefore, M&A in this region is not 
sensitive to the model described in the study. Meantime, the greenfield FDI across all countries 
of this region, while being comparatively lower than M&A during some periods, has been more 
continuous over the all studied periods. Similar to the proneness of FDI inflow to the tax rates, 
greenfield FDI is also sensitive to this indicators as well as to the time to comply with CIT audit. 
Interestingly the latter indicator is very broad for this region with lowest 2 weeks in Algeria and 
highest 60 weeks in Sudan.   
The following tax regulatory and administrative tools help insure FDI inflow to West 
Africa region, such as the overall efficiency of tax regulations described by DTF paying taxes, 
annual number of payments, both the cases and the time for CIT audit, and level of national 
income per capita. Although, similar to North Africa region, on average the level of M&A is 
higher for West Africa region (due to regular M&A in Nigeria and one-time large M&A in Togo 
(2014), Liberia (2010 and 2014), and Guinea (2014)), the continuity of foreign direct 
investments over the years is secured by greenfield FDI. The greenfield FDI in this region is 
driven by the overall effectiveness of tax regulations (DTF paying taxes), number of payments 
and time spent per year, time to obtain VAT refund and level of national income per capita. 
Interestingly, the time to obtain VAT refund has a positive correlation with the level of 
greenfield FDI. This can be described since out of sixteen countries eleven, while levying VAT, 
do not offer VAT refunds, e.g. Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, etc., despite of that foreign 
investors still consider them as potential host economies.   
   Central Africa region is the only area where greenfield FDI exceeds M&A inflows.  
Therefore, FDI inflow and greenfield FDI are more susceptible to the model described by 
equation [4]. Both types of FDI are sensitive to annual number of payments, and time spent to 
file and pay taxes, and level of national income per capita. FDI inflow is also impacted by 
regulations and administrative norms related to CIT audit, while greenfield FDI is more sensitive 





notwithstanding that seven out of ten economies in this region do not offer VAT refund scheme, 
the foreign investors consider them as host economies.    
The comparatively more regular M&A investments in East Africa during last years are 
observed in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Mauritius. The M&A investments in this region are sensitive to        
CIT related tax regulations, where the time to comply with CIT audit is not as broad as in some 
of the previous regions and ranges from 1.5 to 20.5 weeks. Overall, FDI inflow and greenfield 
FDI are sensitive to a wider range of variables of tax regulations. Thus, in both cases we observe 
receptiveness to almost all control variables for tax administration described in the model and 
plus DTF global and GDP per capita. The positive correlation of DTF global suggests that those 
economies with more business friendly practices have better chances to get FDI. 
Notwithstanding the unusual reverse relation between GDP per capita and both FDI modes and 
after analyzing the data it becomes clear that this region has a disperse range of GDP per capita 
[409.40 𝑈𝑆𝐷; 13,542.23𝑈𝑆𝐷] in Madagascar and Seychelles for 2016, respectively. Meantime, 
the lower GDP does not lead to elimination or reductions in the analyzed types of FDI, on the 
contrary, some countries with lower GDP per capita get higher FDI inflow (Ethiopia, Tanzania, 
Madagascar vs Seychelles or Mauritius).      
All types of FDI analyzed in the paper are sensitive to the model [4] applied to Southern 
Africa region. Among ten countries of the region, the largest driver of M&A is South Africa, and 
Mozambique and Botswana at some level, while in the case of greenfield investments the picture 
is more coherent across years. Other countries usually experience single rounds of M&A flows at 
a point of time (e.g. Malawi in 2014). Thus, apart from the level of national income, the 
administrative regulations related to the effective time management for taxpayers, such as time to 
file and pay taxes and time to comply with CIT audit, are the most essential for FDI inflow. 
Investors through mergers and acquisitions also study the tax rates, while the greenfield investors 
in addition to the aforementioned determinants demand overall more business friendly economic 
conditions (DTF global).      
The investigation of East Asia region does not reveal useful information regarding the tax 
indicators, in part due to the smaller number of observations for this region with only two 
countries: South Korea and China. The model for FDI inflow estimates a significant relation with 
DTF global, which is a conclusive indicator for the ease of doing business and overall business 
friendly regulations in the region. The variables for the types of FDI suggest regular inflow of 
FDI to this region and, in general, the inflow through M&A being higher than that of greenfield 
investments.   
The FDI variables for South Asia are very responsive to the determinants of tax 
regulations and administration in the region. The FDI inflow in general is impacted by the 
number of annual payments and the time to file and pay taxes. The time to obtain VAT refund is 
positively correlated with FDI inflow suggesting that in despite to the tax regulations in India or 
Maldives, where levied VAT is not refunded, and longer waiting period in Pakistan (79 weeks) 
to get VAT refund, the highest FDI inflow is still directed to India followed by Iran and Pakistan. 
Similar observations can be obtained for DTF global for this region, where countries with a 
lower score experience higher FDI inflow, which is reflected by the negative sign of the 
correlation coefficient. Similar notion of analysis is applied when discussing the negative signs 
of correlation coefficients for DTF paying taxes, GDP per capita and DTF global for mergers and 
acquisitions, and greenfield FDI.  Meantime, a reduced number of annual payments and time for 
filing tax returns and paying taxes has a significant impact for driving both M&A and greenfield 





Almost all tax regulation and administration related variables have a significant impact 
on FDI in West Asia. Thus, the FDI inflow is greatly impacted by the ratios of taxes that ought to 
be paid, time to obtain VAT refund, time to comply with CIT audit and DTF global. Both 
mergers and acquisitions, and greenfield FDI are significantly impacted by time comply with 
CIT audit. Additionally, the timing for VAT refunds and the fact of having higher GDP per 
capita also play a role in attracting M&A to this region. Greenfield investments also focus on the 
DTF global or at more business friendly economies. This is the region, where the majority of 
countries do not levy VAT and/or CIT. Thus, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab 
Emirates do not levy both taxes.  
 Almost all variables included in the model have a significant impact on FDI inflow in 
South America region, while tax ratio related variables are not very strong determinants (only 10 
percent significance level), all other variables (DTF Paying taxes and number of payments) fit at 
1% significance level. Interestingly, the mergers and acquisitions is not as sensitive to the 
effective tax regulations and the only topic of interest is the number of annual payments. In 
addition two other variables of general nature describing the economies drive M&A here: the 
national income and DTF global. Meantime, in the case of greenfield investments the 
susceptibility to the effective tax regulations is much wider.     
The most significant factor of our model for FDI inflow to Central America is the time to 
comply with CIT audit. This is one of the regions with comparatively reasonable range of 2.5 to 
28 weeks for dealing with the bureaucracy related to audits. Both mergers and acquisitions and 
greenfield investments are impacted by the tax ratios, time to file and pay taxes, and time to 
obtain VAT refund. In addition to that the cases for CIT audit, GDP per capita and DTF global 
are very significant determinants for greenfield investments.     
 The FDI inflow and mergers and acquisitions to Caribbean region is largely impacted by 
the factors of tax regulations and administration and specifically by time to complete, file and 
pay taxes, tax rates, and factors of CIT administration.  FDI inflow is also impacted by DTF 
paying taxes, as a comprehensive score for overall effectiveness of tax administration. While 
greenfield FDI in addition to the time for tax filing and cases for CIT, is also impacted by the 
level of economic development. While the FDI inflow for this region is continuous across years; 
there are no merger and acquisition transactions for number of countries, such as Antigua and 
Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, and St. Lucia. Jamaica and Haiti have 
had only single instances of M&A inflows. Greenfield investments, while being comparatively 
low, ensure more sustainable flow of foreign direct investments in these countries.   
In South-East Europe the most significant determinants for FDI inflow is the number of 
cases for CIT audit, where the negative sign suggests that the economies with lower number of 
cases are more favorable for investors (the lowest is in Serbia with number of cases ranging in 0-
25% of all cases). Mergers and acquisitions are more focused on tax regulation and 
administration determinants including annual number of payments, tax rates, and time to obtain 
VAT refund. While investments in greenfield FDI consider factors, such as the time to complete, 
file and pay taxes and time to obtain VAT refund (again Serbia being the lowest and most 
effective in time for obtaining VAT refund in 14.7 weeks and therefore securing the highest 
M&A and greenfield FDI in the region). 
 In the CIS region the factors that determine the FDI inflow are tax rates and specifically 
labor tax and contributions, and other taxes, time for both to obtain VAT refund and to comply 
with CIT audit, GDP per capita and DTF global. While for mergers and acquisitions the most 





economic development. The investments in greenfield FDI are determined by the DTF Paying 
taxes, time to obtain VAT refund, GDP per capita and DTF global. Interestingly, the negative 
sign for correlation coefficient of both DTF paying taxes and DTF global suggests that greenfield 
FDI are not necessarily directed to the most efficient economies in terms ease of doing business 
or most efficient tax administration and regulations.  
 
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Our study confirms that decisions related to foreign direct investments are complex. The 
model we use for the analysis that includes variables describing tax administration effectiveness, 
scaled determinants for tax regulations and tax ratios proved to be useful in the analysis of the 
relation with the FDI inflow and two modes of FDI, such as cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions and greenfield FDI. This notion of complexity is multiplied when an investigation is 
conducted on a region-by-region basis. New details are revealed that may contradict with the 
generally accepted strategies applied by governments to improve FDI inflows. Therefore, the 
public policy decisions regarding specific types of FDI may focus on discrepant scope of 
government and specifically tax regulations and administration factors typical for given regions. 
For instance, in some regions the increase in annual number of cases considered for CIT audit 
may be viewed by investors as a negative factor for investments, as it may require additional 
time or resources to deal with the audit (West Africa and South-East Europe). In other regions, 
the same factor may be viewed as positive for investments, as it may be considered as an 
additional level of created accountability that would result in avoidance of financial problems in 
long-term (European Union, Central Africa, South America and Caribbean). If the types of 
investments are considered, the most thought through in terms of tax specifics investments seem 
to be greenfield FDI, since our investigation estimated the highest level of relations between tax 
administration factors and the model describing greenfield FDI, of which the DTF global, for the 
overall business friendly regulations, and then time to file and pay taxes were two most 
significant determinants. FDI inflow and mergers and acquisitions are highly impacted by the 
level of economic development of a host country, followed by the time to comply with CIT 
audit, which is a measure describing effectiveness of tax administration. Therefore, public 
policies in any given country could be “catered” to attract or increase those types of FDI that 
they are most interested. Another takeaway is that the general information about the trends for 
public policies in tax management applied investments is very limited and sometimes can be 
misleading (as previously discussed) to consider for regional specific topics. Therefore a region-
by region analysis would be the most useful for developing strategies to attract FDI.      
This study can potentially become a helpful tool for government administrators who are 
looking for possibilities to improve foreign direct investment inflows in their countries. The 
study findings can guide through the decisions on which types of investments would be 
comparatively easier to attract for a given economy with already existing tax regulations at 
specific level of performance. Also it may be helpful to find out those specific tax administration 
and regulation areas improvement of which would result in higher investment flows. For instance 
if assumed that São Tomé and Príncipe as a lower middle income country in Central Africa 
region wants to attract greenfield FDI, their government administrators will consider Table 6 and 
determine which factors are the most significant for their region. They can reduce time to comply 
with CIT audit from 9 weeks, which is their economy’s current performance (found in the Paying 
Taxes topic of Doing Business), to 3 weeks, which is the best performance for the region 





(current performance) to 25-50% per year, as it seems that the investors are interested in higher 
surveillance ratio of CIT audit. Similarly, this study can guide investors, since it outlines the 
main tax regulation factors by regions that have already been considered by other investors and 
may reduce their cost for conducting this specific type of investigation of targeted economies or 
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Table 1.  List of Countries included in the study divided by regions* 
 
Sources: UN Conference on Trade and Development report, 2018 and World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2018 































Austria European Union OECD United States North America OECD Congo, Rep. Central Africa SSA Nepal South Asia Asia Mexico Central America LAC










Bulgaria European Union ECA IsraelOther Dev. economies OECD Gabon Central Africa SSA Sri Lanka South Asia Asia Panama Central America LAC
Croatia European Union ECA JapanOther Dev. economies OECD Rwanda Central Africa SSA Bahrain West Asia MENA
Cyprus European Union ECA New ZealandOther Dev. economies OECD Comoros East Africa SSA Iraq West Asia MENA
Czech 
Republic
European Union OECD Algeria North Africa MENA
São Tomé 
and Príncipe
Central Africa SSA Jordan West Asia MENA Bahamas, The Central America LAC
Denmark European Union OECD Egypt, Arab Rep. North Africa MENA Djibouti East Africa MENA Kuwait West Asia MENA Barbados Central America LAC
Estonia European Union OECD Morocco North Africa MENA Eritrea East Africa SSA Lebanon West Asia MENA Dominica Central America LAC
Finland European Union OECD South Sudan North Africa SSA Ethiopia East Africa SSA Oman West Asia MENA Dominican Rep. Central America LAC
France European Union OECD Sudan North Africa SSA Kenya East Africa SSA Qatar West Asia MENA Grenada Central America LAC
Germany European Union OECD Tunisia North Africa MENA Madagascar East Africa SSA Saudi Arabia West Asia MENA Haiti Central America LAC
Greece European Union OECD Benin West Africa SSA Mauritius East Africa SSA Turkey West Asia ECA Jamaica Central America LAC
Hungary European Union OECD Burkina Faso West Africa SSA Seychelles East Africa SSA El Salvador Central America LAC St. Lucia Central America LAC
Ireland European Union OECD Cabo Verde West Africa SSA Tanzania East Africa SSA Yemen, Rep. West Asia MENA Nicaragua Central America LAC
Italy European Union OECD Côte d'Ivoire West Africa SSA Uganda East Africa SSA Argentina South America LAC Albania South-East Europe ECA
Latvia European Union OECD Gambia, The West Africa SSA Angola Southern Africa SSA Bolivia South America LAC
Lithuania European Union ECA Ghana West Africa SSA Botswana Southern Africa SSA Brazil South America LAC
Luxembourg European Union OECD Guinea West Africa SSA Lesotho Southern Africa SSA Chile South America OECD Macedonia, FYR South-East Europe ECA
Malta European Union MENA Guinea-Bissau West Africa SSA Malawi Southern Africa SSA Colombia South America LAC Montenegro South-East Europe ECA
Netherlands European Union OECD Liberia West Africa SSA Mozambique Southern Africa SSA Ecuador South America LAC Serbia South-East Europe ECA
Poland European Union OECD Mali West Africa SSA Namibia Southern Africa SSA Ecuador South America LAC Armenia CIS  ECA
Portugal European Union OECD Mauritania West Africa SSA South Africa Southern Africa SSA Guyana South America LAC Azerbaijan CIS  ECA
Romania European Union ECA Niger West Africa SSA Swaziland Southern Africa SSA Paraguay South America LAC Belarus CIS  ECA
Slovak Rep. European Union OECD Nigeria West Africa SSA Zambia Southern Africa SSA Peru South America LAC Georgia CIS  ECA
Slovenia European Union OECD Senegal West Africa SSA Zimbabwe Southern Africa SSA Suriname South America LAC Kazakhstan CIS  ECA
Spain European Union OECD Sierra Leone West Africa SSA China East Asia Asia Uruguay South America LAC Kyrgyz Republic CIS  ECA
Sweden European Union OECD Togo West Africa SSA Korea, Rep. East Asia OECD Venezuela, RB South America LAC Moldova CIS  ECA
Iceland Other Dev. Europe OECD Burundi Central Africa SSA Bangladesh South Asia Asia Belize Central America LAC
Norway Other Dev. Europe OECD Cameroon Central Africa SSA Bhutan South Asia Asia Costa Rica Central America LAC
United 
Kingdom






West Asia MENA Tajikistan CIS  ECA
Switzerland Other Dev. Europe OECD Chad Central Africa SSA India South Asia Asia Guatemala Central America LAC Ukraine CIS  ECA
















Table 2. Variables, definitions and data sources: description and descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3. Tests for defining Random Effects as the best fit model 
 
 




Hausman test for random effects 
 
 
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =  1399.80
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     3.447013       1.856613
                       e     2.284074       1.511315
               lnFDIin~w     7.164419       2.676643
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        lnFDIinflow[Country,t] = Xb + u[Country] + e[Country,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =           .
                          =        0.00
                  chi2(0) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
      ln_GDP      .9910888     .9910888               0               0
  Othertaxes     -.2445423    -.2445423               0               0
Labortaxan~s     -.2333198    -.2333198               0               0
   Profittax     -.2432664    -.2432664               0               0
Totaltaxrate      .2470412     .2470412               0               0
        Time      .0012027     .0012027               0               0
    Payments      .0020437     .0020437               0               0
DTFPayingt~s      .0002635     .0002635               0               0
   DTFglobal      .0004629     .0004629               0               0
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))





Table 4. General results for FDI simulations 
 
 
Table 5. Results for FDI inflow simulation sorted by regions 
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0.0292 11.440 17.526* 16.910 0.037 .004 0.034*** -0.007** 0.012 0.158 0.012** 0.066***  -.053*** -0.0002 -0.009 -0.018 -.013***
(0.032) (8.938) (10.369) (12.779) (0.035) (.0080 (0.008) (0.003) (0.024) (0.249) (0.006) (0.019) (.008) (0.014) (0.010) (0.016) (.004)
1.559* 4.738 0 -767.284 0.041 -0.618* 2.069*** 0.363 -0.020 0 -0.618 0.703 .882*** -1.135** 0.523* -1.047*** -.110
(0.851) (63.373) omitted (593.360) (0.759) (0.352) (0.253) (0.279) (0.488) omitted (0.352) (0.446) (.275) (0.542) (0.270) (0.400) (.210)
-0.074 19.652 -34.628* 34.923 0.032 0.066** -0.010 -0.082** 0.267*** 1.079 0.066 0.039* -.149*** .218*** -.029* 0.040 .168***
(0.054) (20.447) (20.303) (26.365) (0.066) (0.027) (0.017) (0.037) (0.066) (5.038) (0.027) (0.023) (.028) 0.054326 (0.016) (0.057)  (.062)
1.651** -45.868** 25.456* 10.658 -3.671* .794*  1.867*** -.406 ***  2.217***  -7.154 -.011  1.347 .712***  .266  -.220 1.266  2.008***
(0.734) (18.803) (14.756) (18.524) (1.966) (0.440) (0.285) (0.114) (0.604) (6.669) (0.208) (0.916) (.182) (0.749) (0.239) (2.519) (.238)
-0.006 -0.710 0.323 1.325* 0.135  .003 .189*** 0.048*** -0.020 0.583* -0.278*** 0.167* .372*** 0.010 -0.004 -0.017  -.051***
(0.033) (1.130) (0.276) (0.767) (0.136)  (.027) (0.037) (0.014) (0.041) (0.322) (0.029) (0.097) (.016) (0.065) (0.012) (0.033) (.015)
Number of obs. 228 24 16 32 48  128 80 80 80 16 64 88 96 64 80 40 88
Number of groups 28 3 2 4 6  16 10 10 10 2 8 11 12 8 10 5 11
R-sq:
within 0.012 0.703 0.810 0.260 0.260 0.157 0.155 0.329 0.051 0.477 0.193  0.137  0.033 0.072 0.183 0.215 0.148
between 0.356 1 1 1 1 0.309 0.991 0.991 0.866 1 0.996 0.892  0.988 0.999 0.960 1 0.948
overall 0.158 0.759 0.976 0.553 0.553 0.269 0.991 0.926 0.639 0.984 0.922  0.601 0.565 0.840 0.666 0.864 0.831
Error:
sigma_u: 1.692 0 0 0 0 0.759 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
sigma_e: 2.380 2.288 0.257 3.034 3.034 0.797 1.319 0.359 0.808 0.303 0.532 1.756  .408 0.793 5.724 0.378 0.557
rho: 0.336 0 0 0 0 0.476 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 Wald chi2(13) 12.47 283.24 . . 23.53 27.2 197.02 836.99 118.7 0 601.26 113.04 2601.96 266.88 133.44 171.24 369.82
DTF global   
Labor Tax & Contributions
Other Taxes  
Time to Obtain VAT Refund
Cases for CIT Audit 
Time to Comply with CIT 
Audit
Ln GDP per Capita
_Cons
DTF Paying taxes   
Number of Payments 
Time
Total Tax Rate 





Table 6. Results for cross-border M&A simulation sorted by regions 
 




































-24.681** 0 0  303.676  -13.750 -10.141 -1.329 5.135  -41.027** 0   42.585*** -24.803 -11.539 17.559 -11.365 45.321 -14.57
(11.715) omitted omitted (327.068) (21.871)  (7.035)  (3.514)  (6.174)  (18.756) omitted (8.478) (15.733)  (10.452) (24.899) (7.407) (95.618) (5.924)***
-0.026 0.402* -0.428 .017 .079 .042 .001  .002 .070 -0.554 -0.155**  .038  -.169** .030  .065  .172 .084
(0.075) (0.211) (0.360) (.574) (.120) (.049)  (.032) (.061)  (.144) (1.419) (0.070) (.076) (.068) (.104) (.057) (.146) (.060)
0.010 -0.610 -2.858**  -4.121** .052 .068* .002 -.065  .094 -0.434 -.123**  .126 -.126***  -.093 .037 .117* .047**
(0.026) (0.516) (1.309) (1.927) (.105) (.038) ( .025) (.049) (.105) (2.772) (.050) (.099) ( .045) (.077) (.037) (.064) (.021)
-0.002 -0.179  .120 .010 .006  .002  -.001 -.006 .011 -0.173 -.015***  .010  .0003  .029*** -.012**  -.004 .003 
(0.005) (0.200) (.082) (.094) (.009) (.004) (.002)  (.006) (.009) (0.206) (.004) ( .012)  (.002) (.011)  (.006) ( .016) (.004)
1.200 8.710 8.312**  -3.122 10.043  4.330 -.229  5.233 -9.401* 5.849 8.571  -8.804  2.105 -15.892**  -6.287* 16.575** .067
(2.641) (6.968)  (3.968)  (9.141)  (8.957)  (2.833)  (2.460)  (4.090)  (5.716) (55.519) (7.641)  (9.068)  (5.696) (6.970)  (3.271) (6.794) (4.482)
-1.177 -8.730  -8.200** 2.866  -9.797 -4.356  .249  -5.196 9.452* -7.257002 -8.556   8.759  -2.051 15.822**  6.306*  -16.386** -.013
(2.640) (6.482)  (3.936)  (9.258)  (8.894)  (2.827) (2.462)  (4.075)  (5.714) (55.124)  (7.635)  (9.094) ( 5.662)  (6.923) (3.283) (6.796)  (4.488)
-1.181 -8.746  -7.930** 4.200  -10.143 -4.374 .228 -5.209  9.785* -6.171  -8.385 8.582 -2.210  15.917**  6.559** -16.419**  -.092
(2.643) (6.769)  (3.870) ( 9.889) (8.961)  (2.844)  (2.463) (4.092) (5.709) (54.274)  (7.659) (9.059)  (5.709) (6.941)  (3.256) (6.792)  (4.486)
-1.198 -10.415* -6.702* 8.118 -9.994 -4.322 .230  -5.216 9.481* 0.883  -8.569  8.923 -2.148 15.723**  6.290*  -17.360** -.048
(2.640) (6.017) ( 4.043) (8.949)  (8.906) (2.834)  (2.461)  (4.091)  (5.713) (58.745) (7.640)  (8.906) (5.693) (6.994)  (3.268)  (7.041)  (4.484)
0.007 10.550***  57.988** 15.336 .005 -.002  -.002 .008 .089** 2.002 .016  .078*** .011 -.085** .014  -.128*  -.007
(0.031) (3.635)  (26.000)  (9.773) (.041) (.013) (.005)  (.009)  (.045) (3.192)  (.013) (.023) ( .031)  (.034) (.013) ( .074) (.011)
1.456* -39.951 0 -600.028  1.076  .056  .096  -2.715*** .353 0 -.161 -.767 .042 -1.804  -.016 .241 1.802***
(0.844) (25.776) omitted (453.801) (.873)  (.571) ( .171) ( .915) ( .904) omitted (.684) (.539) (1.073) ( 1.337) (.350) (1.841) (.646) 
-0.090* 25.475*** -114.078** 26.116 -.047 .0149 .0114 .305** .212* 52.983  -.039**  .070***  .029 .176 .052***  .050  -.239 
(0.054) (8.316)  (50.909)  (20.164) (.076) (.044) ( .011)  (.121) (.123) (64.574)  (.016)  (.027) (.109) (.134) (.020)5 ( .262) (.191) 
3.181*** -25.924***  82.445**  19.688  .862  .492  .132 -.156 2.369** -21.033 -.933**  1.965*  1.899***  -2.150  .329  -7.268 1.518**
(0.709) (7.648) (37.000)  (14.168)  (2.262)  (.717) (.192) (.373)  (1.119) (85.472) (.446)  (1.108)  (.713)  (1.847) (.310)  (11.584) (.732)
-0.020 -0.317 0.640 -.706 -.036  .056   .005  .012 .117 -2.120  -.310*** .083 .179*** .085  .012 .059 -.075
(0.028) (0.460) (0.693) (.587) (.157)  (.045)  (.025)  (.046) (.076) (4.131) ( .061) (.117) ( .061) (.161) (.015) ( .152) (.047)
Number of obs. 224 24 16 32 48  128 80 80 80 16 64 88 96 64 80 40 88
Number of groups 28 3 2 4 6  16 10 10 10 2 8 11 12 8 10 5 11
R-sq:
within 0.005 0.779  0.777 0.460  0.068 0.084  0.022 0.0378 0.012 0.403  0.167 0.005  0.033 0.069 0.182  0.324 0.137
between 0.641 1 1.000 1  0.998 0.125  0.876 0.987 0.878 1  0.999  0.862 0.988 0.965  0.976  0.999 0.926
overall 0.425 0.966  0.886 0.552 0.577  0.096  0.165  0.410  0.371 0.744 0.807 0.391 0.565 0.634  0.433 0.462  0.520
Error:
sigma_u: 1.770 0 0 0 0 1.365 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
sigma_e: 1.962 0.936 .645  2.321  2.025  1.499  .936 1.491  1.975 3.880 1.464 2.312  2.540  1.957 1.396  1.762  1.762
rho: 0.449 0 0 0 0 .453 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 Wald chi2(13) 32.46 1526.07 23.41  47.67 10.59  13.21 46.52  39.58 213.49 48.15 107.91 88.40 51.25  23.20 81.24
Profit Tax  
Labor Tax & Contributions
Other Taxes  
Time to Obtain VAT Refund
Cases for CIT Audit 
Time to Comply with CIT 
Audit
Ln GDP per Capita
DTF global   
Total Tax Rate 
_Cons
DTF Paying taxes   
Number of Payments 
Time
 
Table 7. Results for greenfield FDI simulation sorted by regions 
 



































 -.388 0 0 -5.376  -1.781 -9.685***  -6.025*** -2.908 -20.682** 0 28.442*** -8.887
-
12.033*** 
 3.974 -1.856  56.797** -3.266** 
 (3.172) omitted omitted  (25.640) (5.868) (2.691)  (2.204) (1.994)  (9.743) omitted (3.946) (6.339)  (2.044) (5.581)  (3.078) (24.799) (1.540)
0.004 .048  -.016  .018 .010 .045** .012 .055*** .089 0.039  -.081**  .033 -.062***  .002 .032  -.056 -.029*
(0.013) ( .068) (.040) (.045) (.032) (.022) ( .020) (.020) (.075) (0.057) (.033) (.031) ( .013) (.023) ( .024) ( .038) (.016)
0.003 -.396** .438***  -.300 **  -.007  .052*** .028* .068***  .038 -0.112  -.069*** -.002  -.041***  -.026  -.014  -.026  -.008
(0.004) (.166) (.145) ( .151) (.028) ( .016) (.016) (.016)  (.055) (0.110) (.023) (.040) (.009) (.017) (.015) (.017) (.005)
 .0002  .079 -.018** .003  .004  .003** .003**  .003 .011**  .011 -.009***  -.003  -.001* .006*** .004* -.008*  -.0003
(0.001) (.064) (.009) (.007) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.002) (.005) (0.008) (.002) (.005) (.000) (.003) (.002) (.004) (.001)
 -.808**  1.725 -.142  -.499 3.997* -.430  2.702*  2.251* -4.885* -1.592  -3.381 -1.912 -.972 -4.662*** -1.007 .582  -1.294
(.409)  (2.239) (.439)  (.717)  (2.403)  (1.372) (1.543)  (1.321)  (2.969) (2.201)  (3.557)  (3.653)  (1.114)  (1.562) (1.359)   (1.762)  (1.165)
.792*  -1.831 .107 .499 -4.082*  .422  -2.699*  -2.272*  4.940* 1.594 3.379 1.914 .944  4.750***  1.077 -.646  1.256
(.409)  (2.083) (.435)  (.726) (2.386)  (1.370)  (1.544)  (1.316)  (2.968) (2.185)  (3.554)  (3.664) (1.107) (1.552) (1.364)  (1.763)  (1.167) 
.825**  -1.722  -.544  .655  -4.176*  .378  -2.752* -2.239* 5.137* 1.565  3.522 1.942  .988  4.789***  1.104 -.622 1.282
(.410) (2.175) ( .428)  (.775)  (2.404)  (1.376) (1.545)  (1.322) (2.966) (2.151)  (3.565)  (3.650)  (1.116)  (1.556) (1.353)  (1.762)  (1.166) 
.811** -.953 .111 .645 -4.015* .431 -2.699*  -2.237*  4.994* 1.628 3.376 2.352 .962  4.571***  1.084 -.491  1.280
(.409) (1.933) (.447)  (.702)  (2.390) (1.372) (1.544) (1.321)  (2.968) (2.329) (3.556)  (3.588)  (1.113)  (1.568)  (1.359)  (1.826)  (1.166) 
 .002 -.847  .485 .753 .017 .009**  .015***  -.002 .014 -0.054  .006 .007 .025*** -.019**  -.004  -.162***  -.011***




0  -25.883 .180  -.116  .518 ***
  -
1.290***
 -.212 0 -.451  -.124 -.056  -1.261*** .287** -.280  .242
(.408)  (8.282) omitted (35.575)  (.234)  (.167) (.107)   (.296)   (.469) omitted (.318) (.217) (.210) (.300) (.145)  (.478) (.168)
-.079***  4.374  -.928  1.129 -.043**  .017 -.024 *** .199*** .082 -1.668 -.0136*  .027** .066*** .123***  .009 -.005 -.025
(.027) (2.672) (5.631)  (1.581) (.020) (.013) (.007) (.039) (.064) (2.560) (.007) (.011) (.021) (.030) (.008) (.068) (.050)
.390  -1.124  1.079  2.471**  .551 .698***  -.142 -.658*** 0.460 1.762 -.632*** .345  1.238*** -1.162*** -.395*** -5.028*  1.492*** 
(.259) (2.457) (4.093) (1.111) (.607) (.223) (.121) (.120) (.581) (3.388) (.208) (.446) (.139) (.414) (.129)  (3.004) (.190)
 -.010** .379***  .130*  .004  .067 .023 .087***  .071*** .105*** -0.016 -0.208*** .088*  .110***  .100*** .003 .030 -.041*** 
(.005) (.148) .077  .046  .042  .020  .016 .015 .039 0.164 0.029 .047 .012  .036 .006 .040  .012
Number of obs. 224 24 16 32 48  128 80 80 80 16 64 88 96 64 80 40 88
Number of groups 28 3 2 4 6  16 10 10 10 2 8 11 12 8 10 5 11
R-sq:
within 0.078  0.546  0.898 0.457 0.295  0.012 0.020  0.005 0.039 0.751 0.102  0.020 0.022 0.036 0.073  0.253 0.208
between  0.253 1.000 1.000 1  0.999  0.701 0.962  0.998  0.746 1  0.996  0.881  0.993 0.999  0.967 1.000  0.935
overall  0.245 0.987 0.998  0.981 0.851  0.539  0.682 0.898 0.435 0.994 0.892 0.604 0.932  0.931  0.719 0.897 0.838
Error:
sigma_u: .963 0 0 0 0 .219 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
sigma_e: .289 .299  .071 .182  .570 .558  .525 .423 .508 0.154  .556  .807 .400  .378 .493  .460 .387
rho: .917 0 0 0 0  .134 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 Wald chi2(13) 25.95 3193.97 . 971.6 199.91 80.25 143.88 589.52 51.62 421.16 114.39 1130.70 690.99 171.38 234.75 388.81
Time
_Cons
DTF Paying taxes   
Number of Payments 
Time to Comply with CIT 
Audit
Ln GDP per Capita
DTF global   
Total Tax Rate 
Profit Tax  
Labor Tax & Contributions
Other Taxes  
Time to Obtain VAT Refund
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Asia 










 FDI Inflow 14,836.30  10,606.35  138,788.50 14,675.73  2,084.85    865.73       717.82       615.52       2,610.52    65,704.94  5,234.09    3,998.76    9,873.28    4,680.13    456.28       956.34       5,043.96    
 M&A 6,610.13    6,153.20    78,589.79   2,615.01    111.77       43.96         3.64           23.51         594.48       9,193.68    782.26       501.04       1,132.30    679.38       39.30         55.90         164.29       
 Greenfield FDI 181.10       52.96         1,020.06     159.06       33.44         9.18           4.81           14.11         26.11         644.63       110.64       89.96         67.34         64.70         3.74           30.80         51.34         
 DTF Paying taxes    78.02         87.26         85.05          79.09         62.54         48.91         42.01         67.33         71.58         69.80         63.00         85.74         54.47         60.47         67.46         60.73         58.25         
 Number of Payments  15.04         15.42         9.50            16.31         26.83         46.02         42.06         30.18         31.79         11.06         33.86         16.31         25.72         35.17         36.46         47.83         37.88         
 Time (hours per year) 197.56       96.17         154.50        183.25       287.96       333.38       459.50       180.07       224.64       285.36       273.16       129.25       628.70       273.77       189.89       305.08       323.06       
 Total Tax Rate (% of 
profit) 
42.38         32.63         36.28          39.95         49.17         63.35         80.18         59.51         29.79         52.08         40.97         23.43         53.70         45.61         39.58         26.95         48.41         
 Profit Tax  (% of 
profit) 
12.97         14.08         17.98          26.45         13.40         12.42         22.89         20.83         19.70         13.95         20.12         8.07           16.96         21.55         21.87         9.35           11.21         
 Labor Tax & 
Contributions (% of 
profit) 
27.42         16.77         11.18          11.49         23.62         19.94         17.39         9.53           4.33           33.01         11.88         14.35         17.13         18.00         9.87           14.80         25.02         
 Other Taxes  (% of 
profit) 
1.98           1.78           7.10            2.00           12.15         30.99         39.90         29.17         5.75           5.11           8.98           1.01           19.59         6.05           7.86           2.80           12.18         
 Time to Obtain VAT 
Refund (weeks) 
15.10         17.07         7.00            16.00         77.03         81.28         78.54         49.15         26.30         55.25         46.09         18.43         89.51         60.64         59.85         25.84         62.29         
 Cases for CIT Audit 
(quartile) 
1.32           2.00           2.50            1.50           1.83           1.81           2.70           2.00           1.60           1.00           2.38           1.36           1.42           1.75           1.60           2.40           1.73           
 Time to Comply with 
CIT Audit (hours) 
1.32           8.43           11.50          9.70           17.75         14.09         23.90         10.15         9.48           6.25           30.88         19.05         13.38         11.44         15.75         16.70         5.55           
 DTF global    72.22         79.40         82.59          79.50         53.02         45.64         42.21         50.96         54.66         71.09         55.14         61.78         57.35         61.30         57.32         62.80         59.91         
 GDP per Capita 32,428.30  69,135.89  49,306.51   41,729.63  2,855.72    1,014.71    3,325.99    2,711.64    3,183.79    14,432.80  2,857.10    21,170.99  7,929.26    5,258.67    9,920.98    5,303.05    4,368.65    
 Number of obs. 224.00       24.00         16.00          32.00         48.00         128.00       80.00         80.00         80.00         16.00         64.00         88.00         96.00         64.00         80.00         40.00         88.00         
 Number of groups 28.00         3.00           2.00            4.00           6.00           16.00         10.00         10.00         10.00         2.00           8.00           11.00         12.00         8.00           10.00         5.00           11.00         
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables
